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NEW ALIGNMENTS IN SOUTH INDIAN
POLITICS
The 2001 Assembly Elections
in Tamil Nadu
A. K. J. Wyatt
There has been a strong regional pattern to the politics
of modern Tamil Nadu, intimately related to the caste stratification of Tamil
society.  In contrast to other parts of India, upper-caste brahmins constitute a
very small proportion (approximately 3%) of the population of Tamil Nadu.
Roughly two-thirds of the 62 million population belong to the middle group
of “backward” castes.  Though this umbrella term is widely used, it is some-
what misleading.  Members of these castes do not enjoy high ritual status in
the caste system, hence the term “backward,” but they occupy a wide variety
of socioeconomic positions in Tamil society.  For example, during the colo-
nial period, some members of the backward castes were wealthy owners of
land and businesses.  These leading members of the backward castes resented
brahmin dominance of politics and the professions under British colonial
rule.1  In particular, in the early 20th century, many considered the Indian
National Congress to be an elitist and socially exclusive organization.  E. V.
Ramaswami Naicker asserted himself as a spokesman against brahmin he-
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gemony and was an outspoken critic of Congress.  He formulated a Dravidian
ideology that was frequently expressed in cultural terms and included rhetori-
cal assaults on brahminical religion.  This denigration of religious supersti-
tion was accompanied by calls for reform to mitigate the social inequities
generated by this upper-caste version of Hinduism.
Critics of Congress also called for quotas in political representation and
government employment, to redress the imbalance.  The Dravidian move-
ment was organizationally weak and did not pose a significant threat to Con-
gress in the critical decade of the 1940s.  The Dravidian movement split in
1949, and the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) was formed as a political
party to take the Dravidian ambitions into the formal political arena.  Ini-
tially, the DMK called for a separate Tamil nation to be established.  This
demand was based on an ambiguous notion of Tamil identity.  The precise
boundaries of this social group shifted over time, but at its core was the ma-
jority backward-caste population of the Tamil-speaking area.  This identity
was pitted against that of north Indians and brahmins.  However, leaders of
the Dravidian movement demonstrated ambivalent attitudes toward untouch-
ables and religious minorities.2
The DMK’s Tamil nationalism posed a distinctive challenge to the
electorally dominant Congress Party in the 1950s, though the DMK did not
directly contest the 1952 assembly election and only captured a modest
12.8% of the vote in 1957.  However, the DMK, led by the resourceful C. N.
Annadurai, caught the public imagination in the 1960s.  A number of DMK
leaders also worked in the film industry and were able to insinuate their polit-
ical ideas into the plotlines of films aimed at mainstream Tamil audiences.
New voters were drawn into politics, and electoral politics became more
competitive.  The DMK proved especially popular among the backward
castes in spite of the 1951 expansion of affirmative action programs for them
at the instigation of backward-caste members of Congress.  These programs
took the form of quotas or “reservations” in government employment and
educational institutions.  They were made available by state governments, but
the central government, ambivalent about using caste as a basis for policy,
insisted that the schemes were for the “other backward classes” (OBCs).  The
DMK defeated the Congress Party in the 1967 assembly elections, and  Con-
gress has been out of office in the state ever since.  The DMK abandoned its
separatist ambitions in the early 1960s and made little progress in the area of
social reform.  The cultural aspect of its ideology, however, was reflected in
the use of government office to promote Tamil language and culture.  Madras
2. Narendra Subramanian, Ethnicity and Populist Mobilization: Political Parties, Citizens and
Democracy in South India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 101–19.
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State was renamed Tamil Nadu in 1968.  The proportion of jobs and educa-
tional places reserved for the OBCs was also increased.3
M. Karunanidhi succeeded to the chief minister post following Anna-
durai’s death in office in 1969, leading the party ever since.  The charismatic
film star-turned-politician, M. G. Ramachandran (referred to as “MGR”),
challenged Karunanidhi’s preeminence in 1972.  MGR was expelled from the
party and shortly afterward formed the All India Annadurai DMK
(AIADMK).   The new party went on to win the 1977, 1980, and 1984 state
assembly elections under the leadership of MGR.  The two Dravidian parties
have dominated politics in the state of Tamil Nadu since 1967.
However, the reforming impulse that inspired the Dravidian movement has
weakened in both parties.  Each party has sought to cultivate a broad constit-
uency with their own version of populist mobilization.  The DMK has em-
ployed an empowerment or assertive populism that has tended to win support
among a more upwardly mobile section of the electorate.  In contrast, the
AIADMK has gained stronger support among women and poorer voters, with
its protection or paternalist populism.4  In 1987 MGR died while in office,
and his wife Janaki assumed the post of chief minister.  However, MGR’s
political prote´ge´, Jayalalitha Jeyaram, contested the succession, leading to a
split in the AIADMK.  This helped the DMK to defeat both wings of the
AIADMK in assembly elections held in January 1989.  After the election,
Jayalalitha emerged as the leader of the reunited AIADMK.  The alliance
between Congress and the AIADMK was formed again before the national
parliamentary elections, held in November 1989.  In 1991, the DMK state
government was dismissed by the central government in controversial cir-
cumstances.  The minority national government, led by Prime Minister Chan-
dra Shekhar, was widely seen to be acting in a partisan fashion at the behest
of Congress and the AIADMK. The AIADMK won the ensuing election with
a large majority.  The subsequent period in office was marked by a high de-
gree of personalization as Jayalalitha asserted herself as chief minister and
leader of the party.  More importantly, the AIADMK also acquired a reputa-
tion for corruption between 1991 and 1996.  The DMK played on the nega-
tive perceptions of the incumbent government and won landslide victories in
both the assembly and the Lok Sabha (People’s Assembly, one of the two
houses of parliament) elections of 1996.
3. Ibid., pp. 204–10.
4. The use of populism has been analyzed in these terms by Arun Swamy and Narendra
Subramanian, respectively.  See Swamy, “Parties, Political Identities and the Absence of Mass
Political Violence in South India,” in Amrita Basu and Atul Kohli, Community Conflicts and the
State in India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 109; and Subramanian, Ethnicity and
Populist Mobilization, pp. 74–75.
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The dominance of the two main Dravidian parties is not as assured as it
once was.  The Congress Party has declined further, and a number of new
parties have emerged.  Electoral politics in the state is now marked by fluid
and unstable electoral alliances.  This article will argue that important chang-
es have taken place in the relationship between state and national politics in
Tamil Nadu.  The article will provide an account of the key developments in
the party alignments in the state; assess how these changes shaped the out-
come of the 2001 election; and then consider the longer-term implications of
the results.
A Growing Link between National Politics
and State Politics
The relationship between the central government and the state has been a
critical factor in the political development of Tamil Nadu.  Traditionally, the
Dravidian parties were able to cultivate the perception of the center as a dis-
tant but oppressive force.  At various moments during the 1960s, the DMK
organized vigorous public protests to protect the Tamil language against the
encroachment of Hindi.  The AIADMK, under the leadership of MGR,
evolved a live-and-let-live arrangement whereby Congress (a significant third
force in electoral politics) would abdicate its state-level ambitions in favor of
its national aspirations.  This “MGR formula” resulted in overlapping electo-
ral alliances between the two parties.  Under normal circumstances, Congress
would contest two-thirds of the Lok Sabha seats and in return, the AIADMK
would contest the majority of the state assembly seats.  However, the national
electoral decline of the Congress Party has given the regional parties a stake
in politics at the center as well as in the state.  In the early 1990s, the minority
Congress government at the center relied on the support of the AIADMK.
The further decline of Congress since 1996, and the failure of the Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) to win a majority in the Lok Sabha, created a larger space
for regional parties in national politics.  Regional parties are now critical in
the process of national coalition formation.  Firstly, they held the balance of
power between the two national parties, Congress and the BJP, in the Lok
Sabha.  Secondly, the regional parties are important electoral allies in states
where the national parties are weak.  The BJP in particular has reaped the
rewards of this pragmatic alliance-building with a succession of regional par-
ties across India.  Thus, the party has been able to win seats in states where it
cannot win on its own.
Regional parties from Tamil Nadu have been important players in this
emerging process of national alliance-building.  In 1996 the DMK was part of
the governing United Front (UF) coalition at the center.  However, this mi-
nority government was short-lived, and another general election was called in
1998.  In Tamil Nadu, Jayalalitha began the revival of the AIADMK’s for-
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tunes.  A number of smaller parties were persuaded to ally with the
AIADMK, and as a group they joined the national BJP-led electoral alliance.
This alliance was successful at both the state and national level.  The BJP
alliance emerged as the largest bloc in the new parliament, and the AIADMK
led a multi-party group of 28 members of parliament (MPs) into the gov-
erning coalition.  As the new government was supported by a minority coali-
tion in parliament, Jayalalitha hoped that the pivotal support offered by her
party would oblige the BJP-dominated cabinet to concede to a number of
controversial demands relating to the ambitions of the AIADMK at the state
level.  The foremost demand was that the central government would dismiss
the DMK state government (as had happened in 1991).  When the BJP lead-
ership proved unwilling to oblige, Jayalalitha left the coalition in April 1999,
precipitating another national general election.  Though gaining power at the
state level is clearly the priority for the Dravidian parties, the rewards of
participating in national politics are not to be overlooked.  At a minimum,
leading members of the regional parties have been able to enjoy the perqui-
sites of ministerial office at the center.  Proximity to the central government
allows regional allies to lobby on behalf of their states.  Finally, as noted
above, national politics is perceived as an important arena in which the con-
test for state power can be fought.  When the AIADMK withdrew support
from the BJP-led coalition, the DMK quickly offered its support to Prime
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee.  Membership in the BJP coalition government
was seen as an insurance policy against further attempts by the AIADMK to
destabilize the DMK government.
The impact of national politics on state politics has altered in another way.
The increased frequency of elections has increased the opportunities for new
parties to participate in electoral politics.  Until 1998, Tamil Nadu had been
somewhat unusual in that its assembly elections had either been held at the
same time as the general election or taken place a few months later.  The
1996–2001 period was exceptional, as two national elections took place
while the state assembly was in mid-term.  This has given new parties an
opportunity to test their strength in the run-up to the critical 2001 assembly
election.  It also provided plenty of opportunities for parties to forge and then
refine competitive electoral alliances.  The 2001 assembly elections were an-
ticipated well in advance, and the competitors had two opportunities to test
their electoral strategies.
Changes in the State Party System
The frequent elections since 1996 have revealed shortcomings in the two
Dravidian parties.  Previously, the parties had demonstrated an impressive
ability to mobilize voters.  The DMK knocked Congress out of its leading
place in the 1967 assembly elections, though the party remained an important
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secondary player in the state.5  The DMK under the leadership of Karuna-
nidhi won another majority in 1971.  Four years after its formation, the
AIADMK defeated the DMK in the 1977 assembly elections.  This impres-
sive victory established Congress in third place behind the two leading par-
ties.  The AIADMK won large majorities again in 1980 and 1984.  From
1989, rotation in office became the norm as the DMK won landslide victories
in 1989 and 1996.  The AIADMK won a massive majority in 1991.
Three important changes have taken place in the electoral politics of Tamil
Nadu.  Firstly, a number of new parties have emerged.  Secondly, the Con-
gress Party has declined so much that it is now a spent force in the state.
Thirdly, the Dravidian parties are showing signs of enervation.  As a conse-
quence of these developments, electoral alliances have become much more
important.  Recent changes have been notable, but it is important not to over-
look the evidence of continuity.  Electoral alliances have long been a feature
of the political history of the state.  The party system has been subject to
change ever since the first elections in 1952.  Parties have formed, split, and
declined.  What is significant is that since 1989, a number of smaller parties
have carved out a niche for themselves.  They have gained representation in
the Lok Sabha and the state assembly that they did not enjoy previously.  The
Congress Party was a key alliance partner in the 1970s and 1980s.  However,
it has been displaced by a series of smaller parties.  These parties can now
swing the outcome of elections.  In 1998 these parties allied with the
AIADMK and together they won the largest number of Lok Sabha seats in
the state.  Traditionally, there has been a space for a national party in the
Tamil Nadu party system.  Voters in Tamil Nadu are discerning, voting dif-
ferentially in national and state elections.  The Congress Party could attribute
its electoral survival after 1967 to this tendency, and the party has remained a
significant third force in the state.  It reached a high point in 1989 when it
contested the assembly elections, winning 20.2% of the vote and finishing a
very close third behind Jayalalitha’s faction of the AIADMK.  The space for
a national party has diminished with the national decline of Congress.  All
parties can now claim, with varying degrees of credibility, that they have the
potential to join a national coalition government.  The two main Dravidian
parties have also demonstrated signs of weakness.  The AIADMK has not
recovered its popularity following the excesses of the 1991–96 period in gov-
ernment.  The party leadership is painfully aware of the importance of alli-
ance partners.  The AIADMK has never been organizationally robust, and its
dependence on a strong leader is a continuing weakness.  The leadership of
the DMK is aging and appears to be unable to maintain a strong party in the
5. R. Manivannan, “1991 Tamil Nadu Elections—Issues, Strategies and Performance,” Eco-
nomic and Political Weekly 27:4 (1993), pp. 164–70.
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face of important social and economic changes in Tamil society.  Both parties
have allied with the religious nationalist BJP since 1998, even though they
have their roots in the rationalist and reformist Dravidian tradition.  This has
left both parties open to the criticism of opportunism and ideological lassi-
tude.
In 1989 the Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK, Toiling People’s Party) was
formed under the leadership of Dr. Ramadoss.6  The party currently draws
the majority of its support from the vanniar castes.  This group has been iden-
tified as having low caste status, thus fitting into the most backward caste
category.  It is among the largest caste groups in the state.  The origins of the
PMK lie in protests in 1987 against the reservation system that established a
quota of official posts that could only be filled by candidates from a list of
disadvantaged castes.  The organization representing the vanniars argued that
they were overlooked in the allocation of benefits, and that the problem could
only be solved by setting a quota for the disadvantaged vanniars within the
larger quota.  When the party was formed, the intention was to broaden its
objectives and take up the cause of others disadvantaged by the caste system.
However, the PMK gradually lost the image of a party representing a broad
social base.  It is now considered to be primarily a party that seeks to advance
the interests of the vanniar community.  Across the state, the party has rou-
tinely won around 5% of the vote since the 1989 assembly election.  The
PMK is electorally important because it has concentrated support in a number
of northern districts in Tamil Nadu.  The emergence of the PMK is signifi-
cant because it has demonstrated the renewed importance of direct caste-
based mobilization in Tamil politics.  This type of mobilization was a feature
of electoral politics in the state in the 1950s and 1960s, but the rise of Dravid-
ian nationalism, with its broader ideological vision of a Tamil community,
eclipsed more particular appeals for political support.
In late 1993, a senior DMK leader, V. Gopalsamy, popularly known as
“Vaiko,” was expelled from the DMK because he expressed his discontent
with the dominance of Karunanidhi’s family within the DMK.  In 1994
Vaiko, with the support of a number of middle-ranking DMK party officials,
launched a new party:  the “renaissance” DMK (MDMK).  The MDMK
claims to represent the original spirit of the DMK, and as such, appeals to
voters sympathetic to the DMK but unhappy with its apparent dynastic turn.
Unlike the PMK, the MDMK has not been able to concentrate its electoral
support in a particular region, and it wins votes fairly evenly across the state.
In the 1996 assembly elections, the MDMK contested 178 seats and won
5.8% of the vote.  The party made its electoral breakthrough in 1998 when, as
part of the AIADMK-led alliance, it succeeded in winning five Lok Sabha
6. V. Suresh, “The DMK Debacle: Causes and Portents,” ibid., 27:42 (1992), pp. 2316–17.
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seats.  The AIADMK has also experienced tensions over the issue of leader-
ship.  A number of senior party leaders were expelled from the party during
the 1990s.  One leader, S. Thirunavukkarasu, formed a new party, that is, the
MGR-AIADMK.  One of his leading objectives was to contest Jayalalitha’s
claim to inherit the mantle of the AIADMK’s legendary leader, MGR.
Thirunavukkarasu dissolved his party and rejoined the AIADMK shortly
before the 1996 elections.  However, he was expelled again not long after-
ward, and re-formed his own party.  The party had a localized following and
is centered on its leader, but the DMK cultivated this junior ally in the hope
of undermining the legitimacy of the AIAMDK’s connection with MGR.
In 1996 the Congress Prime Minister Narasimha Rao decided to form an
electoral alliance with the AIADMK to fight the imminent elections in Tamil
Nadu.  This decision was made against the wishes of many within the state
unit of Congress.  It was felt that it was unwise to ally with the AIADMK.
The AIADMK had an extremely poor image after five years running the state
government and was considered to be an electoral liability.  A large section
of the Congress Party split away and formed the Tamil Maanila Congress
(TMC) under the leadership of G. K. Moopanar.  The TMC has had difficulty
creating a distinct identity for itself.  It is now a regional party, though its
origins had been as part of a national party.  Hence, it lacks the unique appeal
of the national Congress Party.  The TMC has continued to ally itself with the
Dravidian parties and this prevents it from emerging as a distinctive alterna-
tive.  Furthermore, the TMC leadership has done nothing to discourage the
incessant speculation that the party will rejoin its parent party at some un-
specified point in the future.
Nevertheless, the party maintains a following scattered across the state and
is regarded as an important ally.  The Congress Party in the state lost most of
its organizational infrastructure after the 1996 split, but the rump of the party
holds onto its name and links to the national party.  As such, it continues to
contest elections but is no longer a viable party outside of an alliance.  It
allied with the AIADMK in the elections of 1996, 1999, and 2001.  The de-
cline of Congress is a defining factor in the new pattern of alliance politics.
Congress held onto the support of about 20% of the electorate for a long
period after its defeat in 1967.  This contributed to a stable pattern of party
competition in the state.  The two Dravidian parties were able to secure more
than 70% of the vote, but Congress remained a crucial alliance partner.  In
many instances, the alliance with Congress was a critical factor in deciding
the outcome of the election.  The central leadership of the Congress Party
ignored the possibilities of coalition government in the state and instead used
the alliances with the Dravidian parties to secure a large number of national
parliamentary seats.
\\Server03\productn\A\ASR\42-5\ASR501.txt unknown Seq: 9  9-OCT-02 17:18
A. K. J. WYATT 741
However, during the late 1990s Congress lost a great deal of its following
in Tamil Nadu.  Congress had contested the 1989 state assembly elections
without allying with either of the Dravidian parties, securing 20.2% of the
vote.  In 1998, Congress contested the Lok Sabha elections without a major
alliance partner and gained a meager 4.8% of the vote.  This result is hardly
surprising, given that the party no longer dominates the national political
scene.  Furthermore, following the party split in 1996, what little that remains
of the party organization has been riven by public displays of personal rivalry
and disunity.  It is difficult to sustain the argument that the combination of
the TMC and Congress shares the loyalty of a large bloc of voters.  In the
1999 Lok Sabha elections, the TMC, without its senior ally the DMK, gained
a mere 7.2% of the vote.  The AIADMK leadership, recognizing the sparse-
ness of the Congress vote, marginalized both parties in the alliance negotia-
tions that are discussed below.  The death in August 2001 of the TMC’s
respected leader Moopanar creates a further problem, as leadership is a key
asset when mobilizing voters in Tamil Nadu.7  In summary, the absence of a
significant third party, such as Congress, able to deliver the plurality of the
vote, has contributed to the emergence of a more plural and uncertain electo-
ral arena.
An important development during the late 1990s was the emergence of a
number of parties seeking independent representation for the Scheduled
Castes (former untouchables) in the state.  The 1991 census recorded the
Scheduled Castes to be 19.2% of the total population of the state.  These
castes have not formed a homogeneous group and, in fact, there are signifi-
cant tensions between them.  The mobilization in Tamil Nadu is part of a
national trend toward social and political activism on the part of the former
untouchables.  The term “dalit” is increasingly used to refer to groups that are
oppressed by and excluded from the caste system.  In Tamil Nadu and else-
where, social and economic change have encouraged more assertive attitudes,
especially on the part of younger educated dalits.  Established social hierar-
chies are increasingly brought into question.  This has had consequences for
electoral politics.  In north India, the Bahujan Samaj Party claims to represent
dalit interests, and its leaders have achieved national prominence.  A number
of dalit parties in Tamil Nadu are seeking to emulate this achievement.  Dalit
activists in the state argue that the major parties have not significantly allevi-
ated their backward social condition.  Furthermore, they argue that the dalits
have faithfully supported existing parties while they remain excluded from
positions of political leadership and are overlooked in the allocation of devel-
7. The leadership of the party passed to Moopanar’s son, G. K. Vasan, who led the TMC into
a merger with the national Congress Party during August 2002.  Following the electoral decline
of both parties in the state since 1996, it remains uncertain whether this will be enough to put the
newly merged party on a path toward recovery.
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opment resources.  The Pudhiya Thamizhagam (PT) was formed just before
the 1998 election.  Its leader, Dr. K. Krishnaswamy, made use of a reputation
established by his organizational work among the Pallars in southern Tamil
Nadu.  He argues for the creation of a “New Tamil Nadu” in which dalits will
not suffer the oppression of the upper castes.  Krishnaswamy won the Ot-
tapidaram assembly seat in the 1996 state assembly elections, on a Janata
Party ticket.  He launched his own party shortly afterward.  The PT contested
15 seats in the 1998 Lok Sabha election.  Though the PT did not win any
seats, it garnered enough votes to spoil the chances of a number of sitting
MPs and to establish itself as a potential alliance partner in future elections.
Events leading up to the 1999 Lok Sabha elections encouraged further dalit
involvement in electoral politics.  The TMC lost its partner, the DMK, to the
BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA).  The TMC was wary of ally-
ing with the AIADMK, and decided instead to look for alternative allies.
Noting the political restiveness of the dalits, the TMC leadership decided to
form an alliance that would include these groups.  This alliance would be
positioned between the AIADMK (still sullied by allegations of corruption)
and the DMK (tainted by association with the Hindu nationalist BJP).  Thus,
the TMC allied with the PT, the Republican Party of India, and the Dalit
Panthers of India (DPI).  The latter organization had concentrated, to this
point, on social mobilization.  However, the 1999 election presented an op-
portunity for the movement to broaden the range of methods it used for mo-
bilizing support.  The DPI is strongest in the northern half of the state.  The
participation of the DPI elicited a strong response from representatives of the
dominant vanniar caste in a number of constituencies.  The violence in the
Chidambaram constituency was particularly intense, sparked by the vigorous
campaign of Thirumavalavan, the charismatic leader of the DPI.  The DPI
failed to capture the seat from the PMK, but the TMC alliance recorded its
best result in Chidambaram.  The 1999 election demonstrated the ability of
dalit parties to mobilize a significant following.  Conversely, the election re-
vealed the faltering appeal of the Dravidian parties among dalit voters.  The
TMC front did not win any seats in the 1999 election, though the importance
of the dalit vote was emphasized.  The election also indicated to some com-
mentators the exciting possibility of a realignment in state politics around an
independent third front.
The BJP, and its predecessor the Jan Sangh, have long been active in the
state, with the latter fielding candidates in the 1952 assembly elections.  The
BJP share of the vote has slowly been increasing since the 1980s, but it was
still only able to win 1.8% of the vote in 1996, when it fielded 145 candidates
in the assembly election.  In 1998, the BJP allied with the AIADMK and won
its first Lok Sabha election in Tamil Nadu.  In 1999, the party allied with the
DMK and increased the number of its MPs from the state from 3 to 4.  The
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alliances with the Dravidian parties have clearly enabled the BJP to extend its
reach, but it would be a mistake to assume that the BJP is not making pro-
gress on its own.  The BJP and its affiliates, including the Vishva Hindu
Parishad and the Hindu Munnani, have been very active in the state.  These
organizations have done much to integrate their political ambitions with the
resilient popular religiosity of Tamil society.  It was long assumed that the
rationalist ideology of the Dravidian movement would be an insurmountable
obstacle to the Hindu nationalist movement in the state.  However, Chief
Minister Jayalalitha’s indulgent attitude toward positions taken by the BJP
between 1991 and 1996 gave Hindu nationalist ideas certain respectability in
the state.  This has been reinforced by the formal alliances between the BJP
and both the AIADMK and DMK, respectively.  Congress was traditionally
the party of the upper-caste elite in the state, but with the party’s decline, the
BJP is well placed to gain support from this small but influential community.
The BJP has also gained credibility from its status as the national party in
government.  Under the leadership of Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the BJP added a
new dimension to electoral alliances in the state.  In the national elections of
1998 and 1999, voters could cast their vote for an alliance that included a
party led by a strong candidate for prime minister, which had a respectable
chance of forming a national government.  With the lackluster performance
of Congress, the only other national party in the state, the BJP would like to
fill the important third position that was occupied by a national party between
1977 and 1991.  It is still too early to predict that the BJP will achieve this
objective.  Many commentators see this as a fanciful ambition.  However, the
background conditions in the state are changing in ways that give the BJP
some grounds for optimism.
In the 1960s, parties of the left experienced an early decline in Tamil
Nadu, with support falling away at the same time that the DMK displaced
Congress as the leading party in the state. However, both the Communist
Party of India (CPI) and the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI[M])
have maintained a following in certain pockets of the state.  Both parties have
accommodated themselves to altered circumstances and entered electoral alli-
ances, usually with the DMK, in order to maintain a slender presence in the
state assembly and among the state’s Lok Sabha MPs.
Shortly before the 2001 election, a number of new parties were formed
including the New Justice Party, the Makkal Tamil Desam Katchi, and the
Kongu Nadu Makkal Katchi.  These parties had an explicit caste base and
were a response to the increased levels of caste-based mobilization in support
of other parties.8  The PMK, the PT, and the DPI have well-defined links
with particular caste groups.  Furthermore, the AIADMK has been happy to
8. T. S. Subramanian, “The Caste of Characters,” Frontline, March 2, 2001, pp. 46–48.
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associate itself with the ambitions of the important thevar caste group.  This
backward caste group is numerically concentrated in the southern part of the
state, with a long history of organizing collectively to engage in electoral
politics.  The formation of new caste-based parties reflects an anxiety that a
small number of castes are cornering state benefits and slowing the progress
of other groups at the same time.  The New Justice Party, led by A. C.
Shanmugam, is just such a party.  Shanmugam claims to represent the inter-
ests of a number of mudaliar castes.  He argued that vanniars, using the polit-
ical vehicle of the PMK, have exploited their electoral strength to get an
excessive level of OBC benefits and political representation for themselves.
Other castes, Shanmugam argues, have lost out as a consequence.  Whatever
the merits of such claims, they are consistent with a political culture in the
state that is hospitable to movements spurred on by a sense of relative group
disadvantage.  Ironically, these new parties are also a symptom and a cause of
party fragmentation.  Events in the national parliament since 1991 have demon-
strated how small parties or individual independents can gain important bene-
fits in the process of coalition formation.  It cannot have escaped the imagina-
tion of the leaders of these small parties that significant advantages would
flow to them in a hung legislature.  In short, the emergence of these new
parties contributed further to the fragmentation of the party system and in-
creased the number of contenders in the 2001 election.  The absence of a
dominant party meant that alliance formation would be a critical determinant
of the election result in 2001.
Alliances and Competitors
Speculation as to the composition of the alliances began shortly after the
conclusion of the 1999 election.  It was widely assumed that the election
would be contested by at least two fronts—one led by the DMK and the other
by the AIADMK.  It was unclear if a third front would also emerge.  The
DMK led the Tamil Nadu section of the NDA alliance that secured a majority
in the Lok Sabha elections in 1999, and that sustains the BJP-led coalition at
the center.  As the NDA supports a government, the alliance has more perma-
nence than a simple electoral alliance, and the DMK looked set to lead a front
into the 2001 election that included the BJP, the MDMK, the PMK, and the
MGR-DMK.  Such an NDA alliance would have been difficult to beat.  The
TMC was demoralized by the performance of its third front, and gave an
early impression that it would join the AIADMK-led front.  This was a
source of unease for the dalit parties, which were an integral part of the
TMC-led third front.  In particular, the PT resented the close links between
the AIADMK and the powerful thevar castes in the southern districts.  At-
tempts to mobilize dalits in this area have met with a strong response from
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various thevar organizations.  In some cases, this has sparked violent clashes
between the two groups.
In February 2001, the PMK left the NDA front and allied with the
AIADMK.  This decisive defection reshaped the alliances.  The dalit parties,
already uneasy about the AIADMK, refused to be led by the TMC into an
alliance with the AIADMK.  The PMK is portrayed by its opponents as viru-
lently “casteist” and opposed to the dalits.  The TMC leadership balked at the
risky prospect of forming another third front.  Consequently, the PT and then
the DPI joined the DMK alliance.  The CPI and the CPI(M) remained in
alliance with the AIADMK because they wished to back a “secular” alliance
opposed to the BJP.  Congress was also anxious to be in a front opposed to its
national rival.  The PMK was an especially desirable partner for the
AIADMK.  The PMK has a concentrated following in the northern districts
of Tamil Nadu, where the AIADMK has traditionally been weak.  The PMK
has a particular appeal among voters from vanniar caste backgrounds, who
would traditionally have voted for the DMK.  The TMC was not entirely
happy with the presence of the PMK in the AIADMK-led alliance, but the
TMC’s Moopanar decided to ally with the AIADMK, and thus closed the
door on the possibility of a viable third front.  P. Chidambaram, a senior
TMC leader and former union finance minister, protested the decision.  He
has been a long-standing critic of Jayalalitha and, along with a number of
other dissidents, he campaigned on behalf of the DMK.  The DMK front was
further weakened when MDMK leader Vaiko decided that the party would
contest a large number of seats independently of either alliance.  The DMK
attempted to compensate for its weakness by forming alliances with a number
of small caste-based parties such as the New Justice Party.  Alongside the
MDMK, a number of smaller parties also contested separately from the two
fronts.  However, the majority of serious contestants for the 2001 assembly
elections were inside one of the two fronts.  A total of 47 parties recognized
by the Election Commission contested the election, along with 977 independ-
ents.  In fact, the number of parties contesting was slightly higher than this, as
some smaller allies, including the DPI, fielded candidates under the symbol
of the major partner in the alliance.
The Campaign
A number of issues seemed set to arise during the campaign, including the
record of the DMK in government, the leadership offered by both parties,
secularism, and claims and counter-claims about corruption in government.
The formal campaign opened in April 2001, with the AIADMK in a strong
position owing to its alliance-building efforts.  However, a number of ques-
tions remained unanswered about the status of the party leader.  Jayalalitha
had been convicted in two corruption cases relating to her period in office
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between 1991 and 1996.  One of the convictions carried a three-year prison
term, though the sentence was not being served, as the case was subject to
appeal.  It was unclear under India’s election laws whether Jayalalitha would
be permitted to contest the election herself or be sworn in as chief minister in
the event of her party getting a majority.  The Election Commission had is-
sued general advice to its returning officers not to accept nominations from
candidates for parliamentary and assembly elections who were currently
under legal convictions for terms of more than two years.  The waters were
further muddied when nominations were filed for Jayalalitha in four different
assembly seats.  The regulations permit nominations in only two seats.  The
local returning officers rejected all four nominations.  Jayalalitha claimed that
the returning officers were acting under orders from Chief Minister Karuna-
nidhi, and that this was part of a wider vendetta against her.  This theme was
pursued throughout the campaign in the hope that voters would feel sympathy
for Jayalalitha.  The subtext that the AIADMK hoped to convey was that
Jayalalitha had been punished by the voters in 1996, she had learned her
lesson, and to pursue the matter through the courts and the nomination pro-
cess amounted to harassment.
The DMK emphasized two key themes during the campaign: good govern-
ment and corruption.  Leadership is a central theme in Tamil political culture.
Predictably, leadership became an issue during the campaign.  The DMK pro-
jected its achievements in government since 1996.  Karunanidhi was por-
trayed as the leader of a party interested in development and good government.
Opinion poll evidence suggests that the development achievements of the
DMK administration were widely accepted by the voters.  The DMK picked
up the campaign against Jayalalitha where they had left off in 1996.  The
corruption allegations were repeated, and voters were asked if they were
ready to trust the AIADMK again.  This issue remained in the public eye
courtesy of the large number of corruption cases that had begun slowly work-
ing their way through the courts from 1996.  In addition, a number of the
cases were still in progress at the time of the election, and the DMK clearly
hoped to benefit from this negative publicity.
Leadership proved an awkward issue for the DMK.  Karunanidhi was the
public face of the DMK in government.  The party and its allies accorded him
the respect one would expect of a leader of Karunanidhi’s experience and
prominence in Tamil Nadu.  In spite of his age and rumored frailty, he trav-
eled during the campaign, delivered a number of speeches, and provided
audiences with a ready supply of his usual aphorisms and pointed asides.  In
view of his advanced years, Karunanidhi acknowledged that this was likely to
be the last campaign he contested.  This immediately begged the question of
who would succeed him and if the succession would take place during
Karunanidhi’s next term in office if the DMK won the election.  M. K. Stalin,
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Karunanidhi’s son and the mayor of the state capital Chennai, was given im-
portant responsibilities before the election and during the campaign.  The ex-
pectation is that Stalin will succeed to the post of party leader in due course,
and Karunanidhi hinted as much during the campaign.  This was an unfortu-
nate moment to make such an announcement.  It raised an ambiguity in the
mind of the voters over the issue of leadership.  Were voters being asked to
reinstate Karunanidhi or to vote additionally for a new DMK chief minister?
In addition, the issue of dynastic succession is a sensitive one inside a party
that still prides itself on having a well-defined organizational structure.
The AIADMK seized on the issue and Jayalalitha mocked the DMK for
having succumbed to “family rule,” accusing Karunanidhi of preparing to
hand over power to his son Stalin.  This is also a sensitive issue for the
DMK’s erstwhile ally, the MDMK.  Karunanidhi was obliged to take a defen-
sive position, insisting that Stalin had the ability to lead the party but that the
DMK would vote on the matter when it became necessary.  In contrast,
Jayalalitha is the key leadership asset of the AIADMK.  She towers above
other leaders within the party to the extent that it is unclear who would suc-
ceed her should the party need a new leader.  This point was emphasized
early in 2000, when a number of senior leaders were relieved of their respon-
sibilities and effectively expelled from the party.  Jayalalitha’s public pres-
ence and experience as chief minister meant that the AIADMK could make a
credible claim to be able to provide strong leadership in government.  Jaya-
lalitha is an impressive campaigner and was able to complete a heavy sched-
ule of public appearances before the election.  Her speeches asked for
sympathy from the voters and esteemed their judgement.  In response to the
corruption cases filed against her, Jayalalitha asked: “Do you not think I
should get justice? I have come here to you for justice.  The people’s court is
the real and true court for justice.”9  The AIADMK has a long-standing ad-
vantage over the DMK among women voters.  Jayalalitha continued to play
to this strength, and alleged that Karunanidhi’s personal attacks on her were
“an insult to women in general.”10  The AIADMK contested the DMK’s
claims to have provided good government by alleging large-scale corruption
during the period since 1996.11
The campaigns conducted by the two alliances were disjointed.  The clash
between the two main Dravidian parties was the main object of interest, but
the alliance partners identified different enemies and issues.  The AIADMK,
9. Swati Das, “Jaya Now Banks on Emotions,” Times of India, April 26, 2001, <http://www.
indiatimes.com/news/260401toi/26mche1.htm/>.
10. K. V. Prasad, “Karunanidhi Desperate: Jayalalitha,” The Hindu, April 29, 2001, <http://
www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2001/04/29/stories/15294012.htm/>.
11. S. Dorairaj, “People’s Verdict Supreme: Jayalalitha,” ibid., April 24, 2001, <http://www.
hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2001/04/24/stories/04242237.htm/>.
\\Server03\productn\A\ASR\42-5\ASR501.txt unknown Seq: 16  9-OCT-02 17:18
748 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLII, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2002
for example, did not criticize the BJP in its campaign.  This fed speculation
that Jayalalitha was unwilling to rule out joining the BJP-led NDA at a future
date.  Yet, a number of the allies justified their presence in the AIADMK
alliance because it was the secular choice.  The decision to ally with the
AIADMK, tainted by the corruption of the 1991–96 period in government,
was difficult.  This was certainly the case with the TMC.  The justification
offered for allying with the AIADMK was the threat to secularism posed by
the BJP.  The TMC was reluctant to criticize the DMK and did not make
corruption an issue in its party manifesto.  Instead, it promised to fight the
“fundamentalist forces which create a communal divide in society.”12  The
different themes highlighted in the campaign exposed some of the disjunc-
tures in the alliances, demonstrating the politically expedient positions taken
by the parties.  The AIADMK, at the head of the so-called secular alliance,
did not appear at all interested in the issue.  The PT and the DPI have a strong
antipathy toward the BJP because they view the party as committed to Hindu
nationalism and the dominance of the upper castes.  Yet, both dalit parties
justified their presence in the local NDA in terms of opposing their local
opponents (the AIADMK and the PMK) in the struggle against caste inequal-
ity.  These manifest contradictions raised the question of why a more-princi-
pled third front genuinely committed to secularism and opposed to caste
oppression was not formed.13
Results
Following the serious violence in the Chidambaram constituency at the time
of the 1999 Lok Sabha election, it was widely predicted that the 2001 elec-
tions would see further violence and polling irregularities.  However, in the
event, the campaign and the polling were largely peaceful.  The campaign
closed on May 9, and the state went to the polls the next day.  The use of
electronic voting machines drastically reduced the number of wasted votes,
and enabled a prompt declaration of the results on the 13th (see Table 1).
The AIADMK alliance won a huge majority, with 195 of the 234 seats in the
assembly.  The AIADMK won an impressive 132 of the 141 seats it con-
tested, and so did not need support from alliance partners in order to form a
government.  Some of the minor parties had hoped that a coalition govern-
ment might be formed.  They were to be disappointed, as Jayalalitha stuck to
her earlier assertion that the AIADMK would rule alone.  Candidates sup-
12. Instead, it concentrated its attacks on the BJP, promising to fight the “fundamentalist
forces which create a communal divide in society.”  Radha Venkatesan, “TMC Goal Is Secular
Governance,” ibid., April 29, 2001, <http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2001/04/29/stories/
04292234.htm/>.
13. M. S. S. Pandian, “The ‘Secular’ Conceit,” ibid., March 20, 2001, <http://www.hinduon
net.com/thehindu/2001/03/20/stories/05202523.htm/>.
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TABLE 1 Tamil Nadu Assembly Election 2001: Seats Won by Parties
Seats Votes
Party Contested Won Won (%)
AIADMK Alliance
AIADMK 141 132 31.4
TMC 32 23 6.7
PMK 27 20 5.6
Congress 17 7 2.5
CPI 7 5 1.5
CPM 8 6 1.7
Independents 2 2 0.4
DMK Alliance
DMK 183 31 30.9
BJP 21 4 3.2
MGR-AIADMK 3 2 0.5
PT 10 0 1.3
Others
MDMK 211 0 4.7
Forward Bloc 1 1 0.1
Independents n.a. 1 5.7
Totals 234 96.2
SOURCE: Calculated from results notified by the Election Commission, <http://www.eci.gov.in/>.
ported by one or another of the two alliances won all but two of the seats.
The only exceptions were the seats won by independents supported by the
AIADMK in the seats where Jayalalitha’s nominations were rejected.  Junior
members of parties allied to the AIADMK complained bitterly that
Jayalalitha had selected the best seats for her own party.  In retrospect, the
party leader can be satisfied that her shrewd judgement paid off.
The MDMK, contesting alone, won 4.7% of the vote, and did not win a
single seat.  However, the decision of the MDMK to part company with the
DMK did have an impact on the outcome.  Opinion poll evidence revealed
that voters in general were happy to follow the alliance preferences of their
preferred party and transfer their vote accordingly.14  Thus, it can be inferred
that the MDMK deprived the DMK alliance of the winning votes in a signifi-
cant number of constituencies.  However, the MDMK was not a critical fac-
tor in allowing the AIADMK to win a majority in the assembly.  The
AIADMK only won 14 seats by a margin smaller than the votes won by the
MDMK.  The canny alliance-building and the allocation of seats enabled the
AMDK to win more than 50% of the vote in 93 seats.
14. Yogendra Yadav, “A Matter of Arithmetic,” Frontline, June 8, 2001, p. 116.
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The proportion of votes cast was a modest 59.1%.  This reflects a general
trend toward falling voter turnout in the state.  There were numerous com-
plaints that registered voters were turned away from polling booths owing to
inadequate lists.  However, a number of other factors were at work.  There
was evidence of middle-class disaffection with the state of party politics.  The
DMK was also out of step with some of its traditional constituencies.  Ideo-
logically committed voters and religious minorities were less than impressed
with the alliance with the BJP.  It was unsurprising, therefore, that turnout
was especially low in the state capital Chennai, which has a large middle
class population and has long been a DMK stronghold.
The AIADMK did well in the south and the west, where it is traditionally
strong.  The alliance with the PMK meant that the AIADMK did well in the
northern districts.  The DMK lost heavily everywhere outside of Chennai.
The dalit parties did not do well from their alliance with the DMK.  There
were numerous reports that DMK cadres refused to cooperate with dalit can-
didates.  Dr. Khrishnaswamy of the PT lost both of the seats he contested.
Only Thirumavalvan of the DPI won a seat in the new assembly.
The dalit parties are divided by their affiliation with different dalit caste
groups.  The DPI has its strongest following among the paraiyars in the
northern part of the state, and the PT jealously projects itself as the holder of
the pallar votebank.  The third-largest group of dalits, the arunthathiyars,
have not been mobilized by either the PT or the DPI.  These parties are more
likely to be supported by the younger and more assertive dalits.  These fac-
tors help to explain why the AIADMK has continued to enjoy support among
dalit voters in the state.  Clearly, the dalit mobilization in Tamil Nadu is far
from complete.  Other junior partners fared better.  The BJP increased the
seats it held to four and the PMK increased its tally to a respectable 20 seats.
The TMC dropped from the 39 seats won in 1996 to 23.  However, it held
onto enough seats to leave it well placed in elections to the Rajya Sabha, the
Council of States that is the other house in Parliament.  In terms of gender,
the obviously significant outcome was the enhanced status of Jayalalitha as
leader of the largest party.  However, the proportion of women nominated for
seats remained small.  The TMC did especially poorly in this regard.  It
promised to support 33% reservation of seats for women in the state legisla-
ture in its manifesto, while failing to nominate any women at all for the as-
sembly elections.15
Impact of the Elections
As the largest party with a majority, the AIADMK formed the government.
Prior to the election uncertainty occurred about Jayalalitha’s eligibility to
15. Radha Venkatesan, “TMC Goal.”
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hold office.  However, AIADMK had made it very clear that Jayalalitha was
the party’s candidate for chief minister, and the party won a clear majority.
In the face of such a solid majority, the governor, to the consternation of the
opposition parties, took the politically expedient decision to allow Jayalalitha
to be sworn in as the new chief minister and assemble a cabinet.  The politi-
cal contest then moved to the courts.  The AIADMK moved to appeal the
convictions against Jayalalitha.  In the meantime, the legality of her holding
office after having been convicted was tested in the courts.  The Supreme
Court ruled against the chief minister, and she resigned from office in Sep-
tember.  Shortly afterward the High Court appeals in the corruption cases
went in Jayalalitha’s favor.  She then successfully contested a by-election in
February 2002 and returned to the chief minister post.
The impact of the 1996 election defeat was still evident when the
AIADMK government assumed office.  In 2001, there was clearly a concern
to prove that the AIADMK was capable of providing good government.  In-
sufficient time has passed to permit a considered opinion to be formed.  Nev-
ertheless, the new government has not neglected public relations possibili-
ties.  Two ministers were sacked for non-performance within weeks of their
appointments.  Jayalalitha has been personally involved in a number of high-
profile welfare initiatives, and the water shortages in Chennai have received
the attention of the state government.  Less encouragingly, the sweeping
transfer of civil servants after the election appears to have been driven more
by political motives than administrative requirements.  A number of investi-
gations were opened that involved members of former Chief Minister
Karunanidhi’s family.  In a dramatic development, several of those under in-
vestigation, including Karunanidhi and his son Stalin, were arrested.  Though
the accused were released on bail shortly afterward, the circumstances sug-
gested the opening of a new chapter in a continuing political vendetta.
Conclusions
The superior resources of the two main Dravidian parties give them an im-
portant advantage and mean they are likely to remain the leading parties in
the state.  Some of these resources are tangible, such as funding, and access
to television and the print media.  The electoral system is another structural
factor.  The “first past the post” electoral system also gives the largest parties
(and the PMK) an important advantage.  Contesting an election outside of an
alliance with a large party makes it unlikely that a smaller party will win
seats.  The only exception to this is where a smaller party, such as the PMK,
has a regional concentration of votes.  So far, the two main parties have ex-
ploited this fear and bullied the smaller parties into accepting seats they are
less likely to win.  The AIADMK and the DMK have allocated seats to en-
sure majorities for themselves.  This has prevented the emergence of coali-
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tion governments in the state so far.  The electoral system also influences
electoral behavior in favor of the major parties.  Conventional wisdom on the
electoral politics of the state has long held that voters value credibility and
are unlikely to waste their vote on a party that does not have a realistic pros-
pect of winning.
The AIADMK and the DMK are also able to draw on intangible resources.
Some would argue that this includes the structural advantage derived from
the dominance of Dravidian ideology in the state.16  It is argued that the re-
gional aspirations and cultural ambitions of the Dravidian parties are now
accepted as the “normal” way of conducting politics in Tamil Nadu.  Thus,
the everyday vocabulary of politics is biased toward Dravidian parties.  The
AIADMK and the DMK can also represent themselves as natural parties of
government, as they alone have been able to rule the state with a democratic
mandate since 1967.  This is particularly important where voters esteem the
prospect of winning when deciding how to cast their vote.  However, it is in
the area of intangible resources, hard won though they were, that the Dravid-
ian parties are most vulnerable.  The ideological discipline of the parties has,
for a number of reasons, been brought into question.  The willingness of both
parties to ally with the BJP does not reflect well on their rationalist back-
ground.  Both parties have demonstrated a tendency toward personalized rule
and gained a reputation for corruption.  Finally, the commitment to broad
Tamil nationalist mobilization has been undermined by the countenance of
narrower, caste-based interests.  The deepening of electoral alliances under-
mines the credibility of the two main parties as being strong parties capable
of winning power on their own.  At the same time, the credibility of the
smaller parties is enhanced as they have demonstrated staying power through
a series of elections.  Some of the smaller parties, such as the DPI and the
BJP, have also demonstrated that they have ideological resources of their
own that they can use to mobilize their own constituencies.  Other parties
have co-opted Dravidian rhetoric and ideology for their own purposes.  Thus,
the PMK argues for the cause of the Tamil language at the same time as it
seeks to advance the interests of the vanniar community.  This position, and
others such as support for a separate homeland for the Sri Lanka Tamils,
seeks to align the PMK with the broad national community of Tamils evoked
by earlier Dravidianists, while the party remains solidly committed to pro-
moting the interests of a much narrower segment of Tamil society.
The AIADMK and the DMK face other challenges too.  The conventional
wisdom on voting behavior in the state appears less convincing.  The credi-
16. S. V. Rajadurai and V. Geetha, “DMK Hegemony: The Cultural Limits to Political Con-
sensus,” in T. V. Sathyamurthy, Region, Religion, Caste, Gender and Culture in Contemporary
India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996).
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bility derived from the perceived ability of a party to win an election is be-
coming less important.  New forms of partisanship are coming into play.
Small parties are increasingly attracting votes, even though they are unlikely
to form a government.  These parties have developed strong partisan links
with their followers.  A notable feature of the 2001 election is that the DMK
lost the election in spite of a successful period in office.  Voters followed
their partisan instincts and voted according to the alliance patterns agreed
upon by their respective parties.  The advantages of financial and media dom-
inance are also losing their importance in the face of important social change
in the state.  The increased emphasis on the importance of caste identity runs
contrary to the broad populist mobilization favored by the two main parties.
During the late 1990s, the DMK appeared ineffectual in the face of rising
caste violence in the state.  The AIADMK, with its links to the thevars, has
been more adept at riding this trend.  Even this tactic is counterproductive, as
it encourages countermobilization among caste groups opposed to the the-
vars.  The political culture that determined alliance formation in the past is
beginning to change.  It was traditionally assumed that the larger parties
would dictate terms to the smaller parties.  This is becoming more difficult.
The PMK is keenly aware of its importance as an alliance partner and has
demonstrated an opportunistic willingness to change sides to suit its ambi-
tions.  The DPI and the PT are—for ideological reasons—less willing to be
seen as acquiescent junior partners of the AIADMK and the DMK.  The tidy
alliance formation of the 2001 election may not be repeated in the future, as
the smaller parties become more confident of their support and frustrated at
being kept out of government.
The AIADMK succeeded in winning an absolute majority in the state as-
sembly in May 2001, and for the time being, the dominance of the Dravidian
parties has been preserved.  This should not distract attention from important
changes taking place in the state party system.  Contributing to this is an
important process of social change.  In the period prior to the finalization of
the electoral alliances, a coalition government in Tamil Nadu seemed a dis-
tinct possibility in the context of these changes.  The AIADMK succeeded in
confounding these developments with its superior alliance-building strategy.
However, it should not be assumed that such a strategy would succeed in
future.  The possibility of a viable third front emerging cannot be ignored.
The central importance of leadership also introduces an element of uncer-
tainty into the politics of the state.  The timing and nature of Karunanidhi’s
succession may have important consequences for the DMK as an organiza-
tion.  The 2001 elections can be read as a temporary reprieve for the
AIADMK and the DMK.  The prospect of alternative alliances and coalition
government in the state cannot be ruled out.
